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Department of Computing Curtin University of Technology
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Abstract— A smart house can be regarded as a surveillance
environment in which the person being observed carries out
activities that range from intimate to more public. What can
be observed depends on the activity, the person observing (e.g.
a carer) and policy. In assisted living smart house environments,
a single privacy policy, applied throughout, would be either too
invasive for an occupant, or too restrictive for an observer, due
to the conflicting goals of surveillance and private environments.
Hence, we propose a dynamic method for altering the level of
privacy in the environment based on the context, the situation
within the environment, encompassing factors relevant to ensur-
ing the occupant’s safety and privacy. The context is mapped
to an appropriate level of privacy, which is implemented by
controlling access to data sources (e.g. video) using data hiding
techniques. The aim of this work is to decrease the invasiveness
of the technology, while retaining the purpose of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart houses seek to enhance a person’s environment
and way of life. Assisted living, a form of smart house,
seeks to monitor a home to ensure the occupant’s safety,
enabling the aged and invalid population to remain in their
homes for longer. However, surveillance applications in such
environments require privacy measures if the technologies are
to be accepted by the occupants. This is due to the private
nature of the home, and the invasive nature of surveillance. In
this paper, we introduce a method for dynamically applying
privacy measures to the monitoring of a smart home based on
the situation within the home. For example, what video data
should a carer be allowed to access at a given moment.
There is a large corpus of work examining design strategies
for privacy in ubiquitous and pervasive computing [1], [2].
Rather than attempting the difficult task of defining privacy,
from examining previous work we identify four key properties
required for the design of privacy sensitive applications. A
dynamic aspect (dependent on situation), and flexibility (able
to accommodate different preferences or perceptions) are
required for the implementation of the privacy management
within the system [1]. Feedback and control mechanisms are
required for communication between the privacy system and
the occupant [2], and have been identified as integral to the
user’s acceptance of such systems. While we have developed a
privacy sensitive smart house that addresses all four properties,
in this paper we focus on the dynamic aspect.
A dynamic approach is required to address the conflict
between the needs, or wants, of the occupant, and the ability of
the system to achieve its purpose. For the occupant, intrusions
into their life should be minimal. However, to perform the
function of the system, an observer, e.g. a carer, should be
given sufficient information to carry out their duties, e.g.
ensure the occupant’s safety. This conflict between privacy and
purpose can be highlighted as follows; a situation in which a
carer has access to all data would enable them to perform their
duty, but, given that a private space is under observation, would
likely be unacceptable to the occupant. Consider the example
of the bathroom, a hazardous environment that requires de-
tailed monitoring, but also requires a high degree of privacy.
Thus, access to data cannot be statically determined across
situations. An approach that can dynamically control access
to data is required, with access in the worst case scenario
differing to access when the situation is considered normal.
We present a framework for a privacy sensitive smart house
that dynamically determines what data an observer can access
given the situation (context). The dynamic aspect is primarily
achieved using two concepts. Firstly, the context space, which
encapsulates the context of the environment, encompassing
aspects of social interaction, spatial location, and the activities
of the occupant. We quantify the context using the multi-modal
analysis of audio, and binary sensor data. Secondly, the privacy
space is a n dimensional representation of the privacy levels
for each information source (dimension in the privacy space).
In this paper we consider a 3D privacy space, consisting of
video, audio, and binary sensor data (e.g. reed switches). The
privacy levels are implemented using data hiding techniques
that obscure access to the data at different resolutions. For
example, no information is shown at the highest level of
privacy, and all data is accessible at the lowest privacy level.
We term points in the privacy space the data access level,
which has an inverse relationship to the privacy level, i.e. a
higher data access level has a lower level of privacy. The multi-
resolution and multi-modal properties of the privacy space
enable the determination of dynamic privacy policies.
The novelty of this work lies in the use of the environmental
context to dynamically alter the applied level of privacy within
a smart house. Privacy in smart house environments is becom-
ing an increasingly salient issue, as ubiquitous technologies
and analysis methods evolve along with the growing need for
assisted living. Consequently, the significance of this work lies
in actively addressing privacy issues in such environments.
II. PRIVACY IN UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS
Previous approaches to addressing privacy in assisted living
applications have limited monitoring to sensor agents [3],
or limited to sensor type, e.g. by using anonymous binary
sensors [4]. Consequently, to examine applications that ac-
tively address privacy issues, we focus on previous work
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in the wider field of ubiquitous computing and surveillance.
From examining the elements of such applications, we have
developed a generic framework (Figure 1) for implementing
privacy sensitive environments. The framework consists of
three components; while the majority of previous approaches
do not contain all components, they can be considered to
be a subset of the framework. The first component consists
of determining the context associated with a property of
the environment, e.g. using a combination of motion sensors
(detect the presence of a person), and an RFID tag (identify
the person), to determine access privileges [5], or the presence
of multiple people [2]. The context component is used to
determine if privacy measures are required or not. The sec-
ond component, the rule set, uses a rule based approach to
determine the privacy level. The rule set interprets the context
data in a binary fashion, determining if privacy measures are
required, e.g. privacy measures are required if a person is
authorised to be in a particular area [5]. The preferences are
then used to determine the level of privacy according to pre-
determined criteria, e.g. an observer’s authorisation level [6],
a user’s predefined preferences [7], or a user’s requested
privacy level [5]. The privacy level is passed to the data
filter component, which implements privacy using data hiding
techniques to filter the data at either two levels, e.g. camera
on or off [2], or at multiple resolutions, e.g. obscuring video
data to mask the occupants identity at different levels, using
methods such as bounding boxes, and shadows [5].
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Fig. 1. A generic framework for developing privacy sensitive applications.
This generic framework has a number of advantages; incor-
porating context and multi-resolution data filtering introduce
a dynamic aspect. However, the dynamic nature is limited to
determining if privacy is implemented or not, as determined
by the context, while predefined, static preferences are used to
determine the privacy filtering level. This limits the scalability
of the context with respect to multiple situations.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
We propose to dynamically adjust the privacy level accord-
ing to the context. To achieve this, the generic framework was
used to develop a specific framework for a privacy sensitive
smart house environment, shown in Figure 2. In addition, this
framework introduces two key ideas for expanding previous
approaches, the context space, and the privacy space.
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Fig. 2. The framework for developing privacy sensitive applications for the
smart house environment (compare to Figure 1).
A. Context Space
In comparison with previous approaches, we adjust the data
access level according to context. Thus the aim of the context
is to influence the level of privacy filtering. Contextual data is
data that is semantically linked to situation. The context space
incorporates multiple aspects of the environment (contexts)
within a single multi-dimensional construct. Each context type
can be discrete or continuous, and, in combination, account for
numerous situation types. We identify four types of context
that are relevant to ensuring the safety of the occupant and to
reducing the invasion of the occupant’s privacy.
1) Spatial Context: The spatial context (where) indicates
the location of the occupant within the smart house, which
is divided into public areas (e.g. kitchen, lounge), and pri-
vate areas (e.g. bedroom, bathroom). The spatial context is
determined as private (0), public (1), or not present (-1)
depending upon the location of the occupant. The purpose
of the social context is, firstly, to distinguish between private
and public areas, as privacy issues arise depending upon the
activities associated with different rooms, e.g. due to the
privacy sensitive activities that occur in the bathroom (private),
a higher level of privacy is required. Secondly, the spatial
context and the purpose of the locations, combined with other
contexts, can be used to identify potential risks.
2) Social Context: The social context (who) determines the
presence of social interaction through the detection of con-
versation1. Conversation is determined by initially detecting
speech audio clips (0.25s) using a decision tree trained to
distinguish between speech, noise, and silence [8]. Then, for
each 1s window of audio (ω), the number of speech clips
in a large window (120s, centred on ω) is determined. If
the proportion of clips exceeds the threshold σ (0.3), ω is
labelled conversation. The purpose of the social context is:
(1) to allow/deny access to the conversation depending on the
observer, e.g. a carer should not be given details of the content
of the conversation and (2) to influence the level of monitoring
as (a) multiple people suggests the occupant is already being
monitored, reducing the need for a high level of monitoring,
and (b) there is a potential risk associated with the presence
of other people (e.g. strangers), so a degree of monitoring
remains necessary.
3) Hazard Context: The hazard context (how and what) is
used to increase awareness in situations associated with the
use of hazardous devices, a device that has to be attended to
while active, or on, e.g. a stove or fridge. The hazard context
consists of two components. The first indicates whether or
not a hazardous device is active, determined by the binary
sensor associated with the device. This component is discrete,
with a value of 0 or 1. The second, termed anxiety [9], is a
probabilistic framework that learns the temporal patterns of
interaction with a hazardous device, and associated devices
in the environment, to detect abnormal interactions when the
hazardous device is active. The anxiety is continuous, and
1Not associated with a telephone, determined using a sensor to detect the
activation of the telephone
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has a range of 0 to 1. If the occupant interacts with the
hazardous device, or responds positively to a query regarding
their status, the anxiety is set to 0. Otherwise, the anxiety
increases as a greater deviation from a normal interaction is
observed. An anxiety of 1, an abnormal interaction, indicates
a potential danger to the occupant; either an accident has
occurred (preventing an interaction with the hazardous device),
or the occupant has forgotten the hazardous device is active.
The latter represents a danger as such devices need to be
attended, e.g. if a stove is left on, it becomes a fire hazard.
4) Activity Context: The activity context (what) is used to
raise awareness if the occupant becomes unusually inactive.
The activity context is determined using the anxiety to learn
typical patterns of interaction with the environment, signalled
by binary sensors and the audio sensor (audible interactions
with the environment indicating general activity [9]). We treat
the audio sensor as a hazardous device, with an absence of
audio activity resulting in an increase in the activity context
value. A lower value indicates a lesser need for monitoring
as the occupant is generally active. However, a high value
indicates an unusual lack of activity (a high expectation that
the occupant should be active). An observer needs to be given
sufficient data access to distinguish between inactivity due to
a passive activity (sleeping or reading), or due to the occupant
being incapacitated due to injury.
B. Rule Set
The rule component is used to map a point in the context
space to a point in the privacy space. The mapping represents
the flexible component of the framework due to the incor-
poration of preferences (purpose). The same context can be
mapped to different points in the privacy space depending
upon the observer’s purpose, e.g. doctors, family, and carers
will all have different levels of data access depending upon the
context. The mapping between the context and privacy spaces
equates to a mapping between semantic concepts. Currently, a
decision tree is used to generate the rules used to perform
the mapping, trained using the context calculated for data
captured within a smart house and labelled with an appropriate
privacy policy. A detailed discussion of the risk analysis
used to determine the labelling is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, an example mapping, for a carer observer
and a single occupant, will be used to examine the dynamic
properties of the framework.
C. Data Filter and Privacy Space
The rule set defines the data access level for each infor-
mation source, the data filter component then implements the
appropriate data hiding technique to represent a point in the
privacy space. The privacy space consists of an axis for each
monitoring modality present in the environment, in this case
three axes are present, one for each modality; audio, video,
and binary sensors. The privacy space is discrete, with the co-
ordinates of each axis representing a data hiding technique.
Hence, a point in the privacy space defines the data access
level for each data type. This enables a multi-modal, multi-
resolution data filter to be described using a single point. While
the filtering method used for corresponding data access levels
differs between data sources, the level of detail is equivalent.
Five levels of filtering are used, increasing in detail from 0 to
4. Access to past data is introduced at levels 3, filtered at the
appropriate level, providing information on events leading to
the current state of the environment. The access levels are:
0− All data is blocked.
1− Audio: Background and foreground (used to indicating
activity) sounds are displayed as labels [10]. Video: The (x, y)
co-ordinates of the occupant are shown on a plan of the smart
house. Sensor: The room in which the occupant is interacting
with sensors, and rooms with active hazardous devices.
2− Audio: The background audio signal, with labels repre-
senting environmental foreground audio and speech. Video: A
bounding box is imposed on the video, replacing the image of
the occupant. Sensor: The device last interacted with, and the
active hazardous devices.
3− Audio: The background and foreground environmental
audio, with a label representing speech. Video: The image of
the occupant is replaced by a shadow image [5], revealing
information on the posture of the occupant, and interactions
with the environment. Sensor: The device interacted with, and
the form of the interaction, and the active hazardous devices.
4− All data is presented to the observer.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
The proposed privacy system was investigated by recording
a number of everyday scenarios within a smart house envi-
ronment simulated within a lab, consisting of two rooms, a
kitchen/lounge area (public) and a bedroom (private). Devices
(e.g. stove, fridge) were placed in the environment to simulate
the real world functionality of the room; binary sensors,
including pressure mats, were used to detect device interaction.
The environment is further augmented with video cameras
(10), and a microphone in each room. Audio was captured
at 44.1kHz, 16bit, in wav format. The sensor logs, and video
and audio streams were captured, stored, and processed offline.
A number of scenarios were captured in three recording
sessions, which were split into two sets, training data (two ses-
sions, 95.2mins and 104mins), and testing data ( 95.3mins).
Each session consisted of numerous scenarios. These included
the extremes of each context, e.g. anxiety values ranging from
0 to 1. Combinations of scenarios were similarly present,
e.g. changing spatial location while increasing anxiety. The
continuous capture of data across scenarios resulted in periods
of transitional context, which combined with the scenarios to
produce a large range of context within the data.
Each element of the context was then calculated (Sec-
tion III-A), at a resolution of 1s, for each data sequence,
to generate a feature vector of the form (Hazard2 (Anxiety),
Hazard1, Social, Activity, Spatial). A ground truth data access
level (point in the privacy space) was then assigned to sections
within each session according to the context type of the
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section (according to the mapping described in Section III-
B). A privacy space point was then assigned to each second
of data according to the label associated with the section
encompassing the data. This process resulted in a context
point, and corresponding privacy point for each second of data.
The data was then used to train and test a decision tree
classifier (J48 [11]) to explore the efficacy of dynamic privacy.
The attribute data used for training consisted of the context
data. The corresponding class data was determined by consid-
ering each point of the privacy space to be a class type, with
14 privacy space classes identified. A number of experiments
were performed to test the extent to which ambiguous context
data is present (1), determine the efficacy of the rules for
mapping between the context and privacy space for unseen
data (2), and determine general performance (3).
The classification results for the experiments (Table I) show
a strong match between the ground truth privacy label and
the privacy label determined by the context. Figure 3 shows
context and corresponding data access levels for audio and
video for a segment of training data set 1 encompassing a
hazardous event (cooking, from point A to B), and a period
of inactivity. The spatial context was 1 (public space), and no
social interaction was present. The figure shows the dynamic
nature of the context and the corresponding dynamic character-
istics of the privacy measures (data access levels) with respect
to the changing context, and the variation present between the
data access levels for different data sources. The classed plots
display the classified data access levels superimposed on the
ground truth plot, thus, visible sections of the classed plots
represents deviation from the ground truth. Such deviations
are generally short pulses or delays at boundaries between
changing access levels due to smoothing.
TABLE I
CONTEXT TO PRIVACY MAPPING RESULTS.
Experiment Training Data Testing Data Result
1 Train 1 and 2 Train 1 and 2 95.36%
Train 1 95.27%
Train 2 95.44%
2 Train 1 and 2 Test 1 91.90%
3 Train 1 and 2 10 fold split 94.60%
V. CONCLUSION
As both the need for assisted living applications and the
sophistication of sensor technology increases, privacy concerns
need to be addressed for the active monitoring of smart homes.
Privacy management is important if the monitoring is to be
accepted by the occupant. In this paper we have detailed
a framework for dynamically altering the privacy level in a
smart house, based on the environmental context. The dynamic
aspect of the framework is required for the surveillance of
private/home environments to decrease the intrusive nature
of the technology, while maintaining the functionality of the
framework. The context comprises several quantifiable aspects
used to identify risks to the occupant’s safety, and privacy
sensitive activities. The privacy measures are implemented
using data hiding techniques for each modality present, to
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Fig. 3. A segment of the Train 1 data set depicting a hazardous event,
displaying corresponding context space elements, and privacy filtering levels
for audio and video.
obscure data at multiple resolutions. In using the context, the
method is capable of dynamically altering the data access level
for a given observer.
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